



**THE ROLE OF ETHIOPIA IN CONFLICT  
RESOLUTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE  
CASE OF SOMALIA (SINCE 1991-PRESENT)**

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**Date of Submission: May, 2016**



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**THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL  
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTERS IN POLITICAL  
SCIENCE OF THE INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL  
OPEN UNIVERSITY**

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# DECLARAION

I hereby declare that the dissertation entitled **THE ROLE OF ETHIOPIA IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE CASE OF SOMALIA (SINCE 1991-PRESENT)** submitted by me for the partial fulfillment of the Masters Degree in Political Science (MPS) to Indira Gandhi National Open University, (IGNOU) New Delhi, is my own original work and has not been submitted earlier, either to IGNOU or to any other institution for the fulfillment of the requirement for any other study. I also declare that no chapter of this manuscript in whole or in part is lifted and incorporated in this report from any earlier work done by me or others.

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# CERTIFICATE

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTES</b>	I
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</b>	III
<b>ABSTRACT</b>	IV
<b>LIST OF ACRONYMS</b>	V
<b>CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION</b>	
1.1 Background of the study	1
1.2 Statement of the problem	2
1.3 Hypothesis	4
1.4 Objective of the study	4
1.4.1 General objective of the study	4
1.4.2 Specific objectives of the study	4
1.5 Significance of the study	5
1.6 Research design	5
1.6.1 Methodology	5
1.6.1.1 Types of data	5
1.7 Limitation of the study	7
1.8 Organization of the study	7
<b>CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONCEPTUALIZATION</b>	
2.1 Literature review and theoretical framework	8
2.2 Conceptualization of conflict and conflict management	12

## **CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND OF SOMALIA**

<b>3.1 General background</b>	16
<b>3.2 External actors in the conflict of Somalia</b>	19

## **CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF ETHIOPIA IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION OF SOMALIA**

<b>4.1 Peace initiatives in Somalia since 1991</b>	24
<b>4.2 Perceptions of various parties over Ethiopia's actions in Somalia</b>	27

## **CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUDING REMARKS**

<b>5.1 Conclusions</b>	31
<b>5.2 Recommendations</b>	32

<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	33
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## **ANNEXES**

<b>Annex I: Maps and Graphs</b>	36
<b>Annex II: List of Interview Questions</b>	41
<b>Annex III: List of Informants</b>	42

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

First and foremost, my sincere gratitude goes to my advisor, Mr. Befekadu Dhaba. I would like to say him ‘thank you very much’ for his intellectual advice and professional guidance. Without his brotherly encouragement and friendly motivation, this thesis could have not been completed and would not be possible even. He, unreservedly, thought and shared me numerous aspects. Besides, I was able to buy-in his humble personal qualities.

My sincere gratitude also goes to the management of the Saint Mary’s University IGNOU (Indira Gandhi National Open University) International Postgraduate Programs Coordination Office, especially Mr. Mosisa Kejela and staff members for their due cooperation and supports during my studies.

Finally, my immense thanks extend to all of the interview resource persons and to their supporting staff. With ample and good times, they generously provided me relevant inputs to this research work to be fully successful. I thank all of them for their open doors, tolerance and patience they paid me during my study; mainly: Mr. Dawit Yohannes, Mr. Hassen Abdi, Lieutenant Colonel Temesgen Aregay, Mr. Berouk Mesfin, Mr. Adamu Agid, Mr. Isleman Ali, Mss. Fartun Mehamed, Dr. Fantahun Ayele, Mr. Abebe Aynete, Mr. Simon Bedza, Dr. Asnake Kefale, Mss. Semira Taha (Secretary and Personal Assistance to the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Somalia to Ethiopia) and the remaining others here unmentioned.

## **ABSTRACT**

This study attempted to critically analyze the underlying causes of the civil war in Somalia. It focuses on identifying the primary and secondary actors in the Somalia conflict, examining the role of external actors such as Ethiopia both in the civil war and in the process of conflict resolution efforts. It also covers the political, economic and military interests of neighboring countries in Somalia, including Ethiopia and other,

The methods employed were interviews and focus group discussions. The diplomats of Somalia in Ethiopia (both Somalia and Somaliland Diplomatic Mission), and ordinary individuals of the Somali origin residing in Ethiopia, the African Union (AU) officials, academicians and researchers, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) officials and concerned organs from Ethiopian government, the diplomats of other concerned countries that have stake in Somalia were involved. This information was triangulated so as to avoid bias and strength the findings of the thesis.

The main findings of the paper is that, Ethiopia has done a lot by itself in initiating the peace process in Somalia and used IGAD and AU forums to advance her interest. Ethiopia as a country has relatively a powerful military in the region and got supports from the international community nonetheless its efforts in conflict resolution of Somalia have not brought about the intended sustainable peace in Somali. One of the main causes for the failure of the peace imitative in Somalia is that Ethiopia is not seen by several parties in Somalia as neutral actor in the peace process.

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
EIIPD	Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Force
EU	European Union
HOA	Horn of Africa
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSC	National Salvation Council
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
ICU/UIC	Islamic Courts Union/Union of Islamic Court
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US/USA	United States/United States of America
USC	United Somali Congress

# **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

## **1.1 Background of the study**

The area popularly known as the Horn of Africa (HOA), has demonstrated significant progress over the last decades in human development and economic growth. Nonetheless, the region is still one of the most insecure areas in the world and ranks low on global indicators of human security, rule of law and good governance. The countries that constitute the HOA are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, North Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and even Tanzania. Large parts of this Region have caught in destructive cycles of poverty, intra-state and inter-state violence and conflict over the past two decades(UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia, 1998). The Ethio-Eritrean full scale war in 1998-2000, cross-border fighting between Sudan and South Sudan in 2012, ongoing inter-clan fighting in Somalia, the Global War on Terror and its ensuing military interventions in Somalia, and the violent outbreak in South Sudan since December 2013-up to now on confirms that the region is still far from durable peace. Various forms of structural violence, such as economic disparity as well as local conflicts within and between different communities are realities faced by people throughout the Region

Nations and States of the Region have shown a growing commitment to address the peace and security, as well as development challenges of the Region. Ethiopia, the most populous with vast territory that borders many Horn countries, has been playing major role in responding-managing-coordinating conflict prevention, resolution, post-conflict reconstruction efforts and peace building. Undeniably, regional bodies like primarily the intergovernmental authority on development (IGAD) and the continental umbrella profoundly the African Union (AU) have been playing important role in ensuring peace and security in this hot Region.

Despite such efforts made mainly by Ethiopia and others, many observers and analysts agree that peace building responses have been scant and uncoordinated in the HOA. Further, most of the responses taken are more of state-centric and militaristic approach that is often limited to conflict management. State-centric analysis and response often overlook local conflicts, which are seen as non-threatening to state security, despite their direct effect on the human security of those that have to deal with them ([documents.worldbank.org](http://documents.worldbank.org)). In addition, focus on militaristic and conflict

management approaches have a tendency to amount to ‘fire-fighting’ or merely containing violent conflicts, without dealing with the root causes of these conflicts. The combination of these realities amounts to incomplete peace building efforts that need to be bolstered with multi-level and comprehensive approaches that include short to long term interventions.

Hence, the overall concern of this study goes on in and around the uncertainties and insecurities observed in Somalia over last two decades, and the role of external actors, mainly efforts made by Ethiopia in the processes of conflict resolution and thereby the establishment of central government in Somalia since the beginning of civil war in 1990s.

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

Measured by almost any criteria, the Horn of Africa in recent decades has been one of the world’s most fragile and unstable regions, experiencing over 200 armed conflicts since 1990 (Paul D. Williams, 2011). As one particularly important external actor in the region, Ethiopia (which it is of relatively the stable and conducive most) and the Ethiopian successive governments have for long looked at the Horn as a whole and especially at Somalia through lenses which have emphasized seriously for security, counterterrorism, religious fanaticism, tribalism, militancy and else associated.

After enjoying brief peace and tranquility following its independent in 1960s, Somalia slowly engulfed in a Hobbesian world, virtually “a war of all against all.” A confluence of factors including colonial legacy, external intervention, clannism, irredentism, Siyad Barre’s dictatorship, and the intensification of armed oppositions contributed to the disintegration of Somalia in 1991. Somalia has been struggling, since then, with the complete absence of a functioning central government and consequently of law and order. The Somali people have gone through all kinds of misery in the past two decades. The anarchy, violence, and poverty forced many Somalis to be displaced, become refugees, and thousands lost their lives.

The effects of the general anarchy in Somalia have not only affected the population of Somalia, they have also had a spillover effect to the Horn of Africa region and the international community. The problem of refugees, the smuggling of small arms and light weapons, the

spreading of terrorism, power vacuum and radicalization are all threats emerging from Somalia, affecting or high potential to affect States of the Horn, essentially of Ethiopia whose border shares and exposure too is at large. The current Ethiopian government, therefore, has engaged actively with or against the Somali conflict for almost two decades since the epoch of the post-cold war.

Although Ethiopia has paid price to solve the problems of Somalian civil war, there has been no appreciable reduction in the level of conflict in the Horn of Africa or any significant signs of movement towards collective security arrangements in Somalia. In fact, the erstwhile-current conflict, terrorism and piracy in this country have its own negative impact on the social, political and economic arena of the horn of Africa's countries, Ethiopia in particular. In Somalia, out of nine million populations, over 3.2 million are in dire need of humanitarian assistance, over 1.2 million have been displaced, and hundreds of thousands have lost their lives when others are refugees in all parts of the world (International Peace Support Training Centre, 2014). These conflicts have challenged and put burden on the development of peace and security mechanisms on Ethiopia. Ethiopia has tried to manage such confrontations and hostilities. However, protracted Conflict-Civil War-Political Violence and Social unrest in Somalia have continued to undermine the conflict resolution capacity of Ethiopia. This study, therefore, aims to underscore the role of Ethiopia in peace and security stabilization of Somalia and challenges encounter with.

## **Research questions**

1. What are the underlying causes for the conflicts in Somalia?
2. Who are the primary and secondary actors in the Somalia Conflict?
3. Does Ethiopia have the capacity to deal with the complex and endless civil war in Somalia?
4. Has Ethiopia perceived by conflicting parties as neutral actor?

## **1.3 Hypothesis**

Owing to the long history of the two countries that has been built on hostility, mutual distrust, fear, and the position of the incumbent Ethiopian regime on Somalia, Ethiopia is not seen by some parties in Somalia as neutral actor.

## **1.4 Objective of the study**

### **1.4.1 General objective of the study**

The overall aim of this study is:-

- To critically analyze the underlined causes of the endless civil war in Somalia which took many lives and had spillover effect in the region; and
- To come up with alternative solutions so that could alleviate the sufferings of the Somalia people and thereby contribute to attaining enduring peace in Somalia and beyond.

### **1.4.2 Specific objectives of the study**

These following specific objectives are kept necessary to meet the overall objective of the study:-

- To identify the roots causes of the prolonged conflict in Somalia;
- To show the major actors (first and second actors) behind the conflict of Somalia;
- To discuss initiatives of peace process undertaken to settle the conflict in Somalia;
- To analyze the interests of stakeholders in Somalia; and
- To forward alternative solutions to the endless war in Somalia so that an enduring peace could be attained in Somalia and the wider region.

## **1.5 Significance of the study**

The findings of the study are hoped to be useful in the following ways:-

1. Offer alternative views to policy makers and government officials who have engaged in the Somali conflict;
2. Contribute to the existing body of knowledge in the field of study;
3. Provide reliable information that could be used by development agents, researchers, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), etc;
4. Contribute to the attainment of sustainable peace and stability of Somalia and the wider region.

## **1.6 Research design**

This research primarily focused on qualitative in its design. Accordingly, the study utilized analytical and explanatory approaches.

### **1.6.1 Methodology**

As the problem of Somalia is complex and age old, the study employed multi-disciplinary approaches that mainly involve political economy. Thus, theories of state formation, inter-state relations drawing on theoretical postulations of Realist and Liberal Schools and other peripherally located theories were used as framework in explaining and analyzing the behaviors and interests of the major actors that have stake in Somalia conflict.

#### **1.6.1.1 Types of data**

The data sources of this research were treated through two major classifications; Primary Data and Secondary Data.

##### **Primary data**

In order to strengthen aspects of the data provided by the secondary source, interviews and focus group discussions were made with: Diplomatic Missions of Somalia in Ethiopia (Somalia and Somaliland); ordinary individuals of the Somali community residing in Ethiopia; IGAD officials and the AU Commission peace and security department officials.

Interviews were also undertaken with academicians of Addis Ababa University (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, and Department of Political Science and International Relations) and Bahir Dar University (Department of History); senior researchers of the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD) and Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis from Institute for Security Studies of Africa (ISS); and with political, military and security personnel of Ethiopian governments that had served and have been serving during the ex-governments and in this regime respectively.

Further, discussions were also held with the incumbent Ethiopian government authorities and policy makers, essentially with officials and experts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia.

## **Secondary data**

The study used a qualitative method of data collection and analyses. Accordingly, secondary sources under the custody of libraries of Addis Ababa University (Libraries of Graduate Studies at the College of Social Sciences and Institute for Peace and Security Studies); the AU Commission peace and security department; and the EIIPD were extensively reviewed and consulted. In addition, various documents and recordings like book publications, speeches, internet resources, electronic media outlets, newspapers, articles, journals, academic works, conference papers, official and administrative reports covering the conflict of Somalia and conflict resolution process since the time of 1991 were used as references.

## **1.7 Limitation of the study**

Ethiopia is one of the ancient countries that maintained its independence from European colonial powers. Since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, she has been playing a vanguard role in the world political affairs, especially in peacekeeping operations and in the diplomatic missions in Africa.

Situated at one of the most sensitive and fragile part of the world, the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia indeed has been playing important roles in resolving conflict and maintaining peace in the sub-region.

Considering these basic facts, the scope of this study focuses on the role that Ethiopia has been playing in Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa, specifically the case in Somalia starting from the end of the Cold War to present times.

## **1.8 Organization of the study**

The study is structured into five chapters. The first chapter starts with the background of the study, the statement of the problem, research questions, hypothesis, objectives, methods,

significance, scope and limitation, and the organization of the paper. The second chapter covers the literature review, conceptual framework and the conceptualization of the key concepts. The third chapter discusses the general background of Somalia with special emphasis of its crises since 1991 onwards. The fourth chapter focuses on analyzing the role of Ethiopia in conflict resolution of Somalia. The fifth chapter discusses conclusion and the way forward, how to rebuild the war devastated country. At the end, the study has references and annexes as well.

# CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

## 2.1 Literature review and theoretical framework

Social Science theories are presumed to be the simplified version of reality. Likewise, international relations theories are social science theories that evolved over time to explain how the international system works and the role of actors in shaping and influencing the outcome of international system. In the contemporary international relations, there are two prominent theories; namely, realism and liberalism that claim as dominant schools of thought. However, there are peripherally located schools of thought that have their own explanations as to how the international system is working, and the role of various actors in the system. In this chapter, the tenets and wisdoms of relevant schools of thought will be briefly reviewed.

The ‘main stream’ schools such as realism and liberalism sidelined other schools of thought and consider themselves as the only legitimate school of thoughts owing to the tenets and wisdom that they claim would enable them to explain why states and other actors behave the way they do in international system. Both Classical Realism and Liberalism focus on human nature and the consequent behaviors that one way or the other affect the outcome of national and international relations.

According to classical realists, states are the monolithic and rational actors in international system, and have no room for other non-state actors. They argue that the characteristics of human nature were put into practice in international politics where every state is functions to garner safety and as there is no power to keep states moral, they indulge in competition which often results in “war of all against all” (Hobbes, 1985).

For the classical realist, the outcomes of international relations are zero-sum game: that is, there will be absolute advantage rather than relative advantage (Morgenthau, 2006; Keohane, 1986; Frankel, 1996).

Realists believe that war is the only ultimate resolution of avoiding conflict. The realist theory assumes the 'power-based', 'force-based' or 'coercive' management of international conflict (John Burton, 1990).

On the other hand, liberalism emphasizes that human nature is good that makes cooperation among nations possible. They blame inadequacy of social institutions and miscommunication between leaders as a cause for conflict and wars between states.

Classical Liberalism is a political belief in which the primary emphasis is placed on securing individuals' freedom by limiting the state's power. They hold that the only real freedom is freedom from coercion, and that state intervention in the economy is a coercive power that restricts the economic freedom of individuals, and so should be avoided as far as possible. Classical liberal thinkers like Jeremy Bentham perceived humans as rational beings who act in their own self-interest by seeking pleasure and avoiding pain.

The wisdoms and tenets of the classical schools of thought was challenged with the post World War II developments such as the divisions of the world into two hostile ideological and the consequent formation of military blocks, the evolution of school of behavioralism in the West labeling classical schools as normative, that lack scientific credentials, ultimately forcing them to fight for their relevance. As the result, the 1970s witnessed the resurgence of the neo-realism and neo-liberalism with different generation and new approaches. The proponents of the two schools departed from human nature by embracing new approaches that they claim their line of thinking scientific (Mingest, 2011:6).

For instance, neo-realism separates itself from the political rules which are situated in human nature and its characteristics and takes the view that the structure in which states exist in international relations is anarchic due to the absence of an overarching authority sovereign. (Jackson, 2001:51)

Neo-realists thus explain that states serve their own interests in the international system by following a strict code of self help due to the absence of any authority above them. Moreover, as

all states exist in a state of anarchy in the international arena of politics, they all pursue self interest and try to acquire power to secure themselves and ensure their survival in a system where no other state or authority will come to save them if they fail to do.

Waltz argues that it is the structural effect of the system which shapes the way its residing units act. He further argues, because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so-or live at the mercy of their military more vigorous neighbors, however, this does not apply that there is constant warfare and conflict amongst states in the state of anarchy but as Mearsheimer, the other neo-realist, explains that there is not constant war but relentless security competition with the possibility of war looming in the background, according to him, institutions can do little to enhance stability in an anarchical international system that generates fear, uncertainty and relentless competition for power and security among states. Institutions are based on the selfish-self-interested calculations of the great powers, they have no independent effect on state behavior and they are therefore not an important cause of peace. In such a situation, no one state can trust another; therefore, cooperation is limited and unstable when it occurs (Waltz, 2001; Mearsheimer, 1994).

Neo-Liberals also departed from human nature and claim that they embraced new approaches that enables them scientifically explain the behavior of state and non-state actors.

The common themes that run through the liberal thinking are; that Human beings are perfectible, that democracy is a necessary tool for that perfectibility to develop and those ideas do matter. Unlike the Realists, the liberals have enormous belief in human progress and the faculty of reason and rationality that each individual is endowed with (Jackson, 2001:48).

Liberalism believes in cooperation and progress; in relation between states, liberals stress the possibilities for cooperation, and the key issue becomes devising international settings in which cooperation can be best achieved. The picture of world politics that results from the liberal view thus is of a complex system of bargaining between multiple actors. Military force is still important but there are other issues like economic, environmental, and technological issues.

There are different strands within liberalism, among them; Sociological liberalism is an international relations theory. It is critical of realist theory which it sees as too state-centric. According to sociological liberalism, relations between nations are more cooperative than governments; relations include not only states, but also between private individuals and societies.

Interdependence liberalism argues that increased interdependence between countries reduces the chance of engaging in conflict. Interdependence liberals such as Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye and Richard N. Cooper see modernization as increasing the level and scope of interdependence between states leading to greater cooperation, of transnational actors.

Republican liberalism, in its part, claims that as a result of the existence of similar domestic political cultures, common moral values, economic cooperation and interdependence; democracies do not go to war due to their domestic culture of peaceful conflict resolutions and common moral values, mutual benefits.

Further, Institutional liberalism claims that international institutions promote cooperation between states; institutions alleviate problems concerning lack of trust between states and reduce state fear.

On the other hand, the school of constructivism sees theories of international relation and international system as a social construction across time and place. The proponents of constructivism argues that social world is not discovered, rather socially constructed, therefore it could be adjusted based on the interest of its members so as to serve the purpose of peace and sustainable development that need to be inclusive (Godliet, 2009: 83).

Feminists on their part argue that political theory and international relation give a central role to man and place women as secondary actor within state system. They complained that gender inequality continues to exist and that in gender role the 'private' and 'natural' roles assigned to women to serve that make their work invisible (Ibid, 2009: 107).

They criticized the state, concept of power. For them, power relations are organized on the bases of gender- masculine traits. Man who is identified with the state and the state is the base of patriarchy relations is Realist discourse.

As to Feminism, Nationalism creates myth that legitimizes the state system in which violence is used as the ultimate arbiter of social conflict.

## **2.2 Conceptualization of conflict and conflict management**

Conflict is a natural phenomenon among humanity that has existed since antiquity. Hence, it is popularly believed that wherever there are people, there always will be conflict. Besides, depending the way you handle, conflict might escalate and lead to nonproductive results, or can be beneficially resolved and lead to quality final products. Therefore, learning to manage conflict is integral to a high-performance team or for peaceful co-existence among humanity. Although very few people go looking for conflict, more often than not, conflict results mainly because of miscommunication between people with regard to their needs, ideas, beliefs, goals, or values. These make conflict resolution, management and transformation skills and institutions relevant and irreplaceable.

Conflict management is, therefore, the practice of being able to identify and handle conflicts sensibly, fairly, and efficiently. It is the process of reducing the negative and destructive capacity of conflict through a number of measures and by working with and through the parties involved in that conflict. This term is sometimes used synonymously with 'conflict regulation'. It covers the entire area of handling conflicts positively at different stages, including those efforts made to prevent conflict, by being proactive. It encompasses conflict limitation, containment and litigation. The aim of conflict management is to enhance learning and group outcomes, including effectiveness or performance in organizational setting (Rahim, 2002).

Conflict Resolution is aimed at terminating conflicts through the constructive solving of problems, distinct from management. In these activity, it is expected that the deep rooted sources of conflict are addressed and resolved, and behavior is no longer violent, or nor are attitudes hostile any longer, while the structure of the conflict has been changed (Mayer, Bernard, 2012).

On the other hand, conflict prevention is proactive way of dealing with conflict before conflict explodes. It refers to strategies used in the pre-violent phase, at the front-end of the curve of conflict. These strategies are intended to keep disputes from escalating into violence. While routine diplomacy takes place during peace time, preventive diplomacy can help address and manage escalating tension. The idea that future wars can be prevented before they break out has been around for many generations. It is an action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change" (Lund, 1996).

As the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations as well as global and regional powers discovered the high costs of managing conflict, there is a strong common perception of benevolence of preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy actions can be implemented by the UN, regional organizations, NGO networks and individual states. Preventive measures include: early warning, fact-findings, early deployment, demilitarized zone, confidence building measures.

Conflict Transformation is hard work that involves all actors in healing the conflict. It is assumed that it goes beyond conflict resolution to build longer standing relationships through a process of change in perceptions and attitudes of parties.

The idea of conflict transformation stems from: the recognition of the dialectical element of conflict about the inevitability of change; and it recognizes the neutrality of conflict as such, and that conflict can be either negative or positive, but parties can transform it into positive to maximize opportunities (Hugh Miall, 2004).

Peace-building is a stage in conflict transformation process. It is an intervention that is designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict by creating a sustainable peace. Peace-building activities address the root causes or potential causes of violence, create a societal

expectation for peaceful conflict resolution and stabilize society politically and socioeconomically.

Successful peace-building activities create an environment supportive of self-sustaining, durable peace; reconcile opponents; prevent conflict from restarting; integrate civil society; create rule of law mechanisms; and address underlying structural and societal issues. Researchers and practitioners also increasingly find that peace-building is most effective and durable when it relies upon local conceptions of peace and the underlying dynamics which foster or enable conflict (Coning, C, 2013).

## **Alternative forms of dispute resolution: negotiation, mediation and arbitration**

For negotiations to take place there has to be disagreement or incompatible goals and aspirations between the conflicting parties.

Negotiations are the major tools for resolving conflicts of interest. It occurs when two parties set forth the type of remedy each desire, and try to reach some sort of an agreement that satisfies everyone involved. In the best-case scenario, negotiations are done between the parties and both come to a happy agreement. Negotiation is a dialogue between two or more people or parties intended to reach a mutually beneficial outcome, resolve points of difference, to gain advantage for an individual or collective, or to craft outcomes to satisfy various interests (Buettner, Ricardo, 2006).

Mediation is an alternate form of conflict resolution that involves assigning a neutral third party to help parties in a disagreement to hear one another, to minimize the harm that can come from disagreement to maximize any area of agreement, and to find a way of preventing the areas of disagreement from interfering with the process of seeking a compromise or mutually agreed outcome([www.dse.vic.gov.au/effectiveengagement/toolkit/tool-mediation-and negotiation](http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/effectiveengagement/toolkit/tool-mediation-and-negotiation)).

Arbitration works a little differently, because this process involves both parties agreeing to allow a third party not only to mediate, but to come to a final decision on the issues. It is a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), a technique for the resolution of disputes outside the courts. The parties to a dispute refer it to arbitration by one or more persons, and agree to be bound by the arbitration decision. A third party reviews the evidence in the case and imposes a decision that is legally binding on both sides and enforceable in the courts (Sullivan, Arthur; Steven M. Sheffrin, 2003).

The theories and strategies discussed in this Chapter will be used as tools in interpreting and in analyzing issues discussed in the next Chapters.

# **CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND OF SOMALIA**

## **3.1 General background**

Somalia, formerly known as the Somali Democratic Republic under communist rule, is a country located in the Horn of Africa, naming Mogadishu as its capital city. It is bordered by Djibouti to the northwest, Kenya to the southwest, the Gulf of Aden with Yemen to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east, and Ethiopia to the west.

It is one of the most strategically important countries in the entire Africa mainly due to its long coast line measured 3,025 km.

The Cushitic populations of the Somali Coast in the Horn of Africa have an ancient history known by Arabs as the Berberi, archaeological evidence indicates their presence in the Horn of Africa by AD 100 and possibly earlier. As early as the seventh century AD, the indigenous Cushitic peoples began to mingle with Arab and Persian traders who had settled along the coast. Interaction over the centuries led to the emergence of a Somali culture bound by common traditions, a single language, and the Islamic faith.

Somalia's modern history began in the late 19th century, when various European powers began to trade and establish themselves in the area.

During the 1830s, Britain was in a period of exploration and occupation of the Gulf of Aden. In 1839, the scramble for Somalia took off, with the British, French and Italians all exerting their dominance to gain control of the area because of the prime trading routes the country held with India and the rest of Asia.

The British influence in the coastal area around Zeila and Berbera was formalized during the 1880s in a series of treaties promising protection to the chieftains of various local Somali clans. The region became a protectorate under the title of British Somaliland.

France and Italy, requiring similar coaling facilities for their own ships, established stations in the northern Somali regions. The French developed Djibouti. The Italians were a little further up the coast at Aseb, in Eritrea. When the European scramble for Africa began, in the 1880s, these were the three powers competing for Somali territory. Soon, they were joined by a fourth rival, Ethiopia, where Menelik II became Emperor in 1889.

Italy established protectorates along the coast eastwards beyond British Somaliland, and Italian companies acquired leases on parts of the east-facing Somali coast. Italy agreed spheres of influence amicably with Britain in 1884, placing the border between British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland just west of Bender Cassim.

However, the declaration of war on British by Italy in 1940s changed the power configuration that involved the locals by taking side along their colonial masters. It gave chance for African soldiers to mix with other soldiers who came from different parts of the world eventually emboldening them to fight against colonial power. These resistances led to the end of colonial rule either by force or through negotiations.

Like many other African countries, Somalia in 1960 got her independence from European colonial powers. Both the British and Italian colonies, in June and July respectively, declared their independence and decided to merge as the Somali Republic. The French colony had to wait until 1977 before becoming independent as Djibouti.

Following independence, the Somali Republic leaders bent on irredentism that involved the claim of land and people located along the adjacent areas. The major political theme in independent Somalia is the need to reunite with three large Somali groups trapped in other states - in French Somaliland, in Ethiopia and in northern Kenya.

In 1964, the young and inexperienced Somalia state went to skirmish war with Ethiopia, however, it was easily controlled by Ethiopia as Ethiopia at the time had huge and trained army in comparison to young Somalia state.

After a brief civil rule, Mohamed Siyad Barre seized power in 1969 to rule Somalia through coup d'état. President Siyad Barre aligned himself with Eastern Block and started fueling Somali nationalism that led to 1977 war with Ethiopia.

In 1977, after the fall of Haile Selassie I, Somalia attacked Ethiopian garrisons in the Ogaden. Soon a Somali army was even besieging the city of Harar and other important territories in Bale and former Sidamo provinces. But, the shift of Soviet Union to Ethiopia tipped the balance of power in favor of Ethiopia putting Somalia in a difficult position. Early in 1978, the Ethiopian army using Soviet equipment and reinforced by troops from Cuba, recaptured the Ogaden. The result was the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees over the borders into Somalia.

The war of 1977/78 that was designed to externalize internal conflict culminated with humiliating defeat created sense of despair that led to division along clan basis.

In the aftermath of this disaster guerrilla war, clan-based and regional based groupings were formed around Somalia with the intention of toppling Siyad's repressive and centralized regime. By 1988 the result was full-scale civil war resulting in the overthrow of Siyad in 1991. He withdrew to the safety of his own clan, becoming one warlord among many in this increasingly chaotic nation. In 1991, the faction controlling the former British Somaliland confused matters by declaring its independence as the republic of Somaliland.

Somalia had enjoyed relatively stable, centralized, and peaceful air for brief years since the time of its Independence until the fall of Siyad Bare. It got, nevertheless, in to a worst catastrophe and a total collapse of the country immediately after Siyad Bare had gone down in 1991. Since then, continuing chaos observed and that state already failed and disintegrated apart (Lidwien Kapteijns, 2008). From 1991 to the present time, Somalia has no a central-functional Government.

When one sees the Post 1991 scenario of Somalia, Somali has become a common ground place of civil war and turmoil. The conflict of Somalia has multiple and complex factors including

political, economic, cultural and ideological aspects. Various external and internal actors have, in this regard, played different roles during the various stages of the conflict.

The contemporary Somali violent internal situations have been among the major deadly conflicts on the continent of Africa. Difficult to determine, however, is as to how to explain causes behind it. There is general consensus about it being inconsistent to theoretical and practical expectations (Abdulahi A. Osman, 2007). This makes it difficult if not impossible, however, to exhaust all the causations of the conflict especially in its post 1991 manifestations.

The Somali conflicts have been caused and reinforced by factors which at times trace their origins in to the past and express themselves in different formats. In this connection, an attempt has been made to locate the underlying factors to the Somalia conflicts and those other factors which exacerbated and sustained the situation until the present.

### **3.2 External actors in the conflict of Somalia**

External actors are those secondary actors that are not Somali, but who have stakes in Somalia. Several countries have provided support to the factions in the conflict. Immediate neighbors, adjacent Middle Eastern and Distant powers have been meddling in Somalian affairs to advance their own interest. Ethiopia is among the neighboring counties that has stake in Somalia. Ethiopia and Somalia share the same ethnic groups that straddle along the borders and have long borders. As the result, any development taking place in Somalia directly or indirectly affects Ethiopia's internal peace and development.

Ethiopia is regarded as an influential external actor in the Somali conflict. The country has a long undemarcated border with Somalia in the eastern direction. Ethiopia and Somalia have a long hostile history over the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia which has resulted in interstate wars between the two countries in 1964 and 1977/78. While the hostility between the two countries was unresolved officially in an interstate process, the civil war broke out in Somalia 1991. This created a power vacuum as armed groups were vying to capture the war ravaged country. These state of affairs brought about new security concern for Ethiopia. Groups of different identity in Somalia threatened and carried out attacks in Ethiopia.

The traditional rivalry between the two countries was exacerbated by the recent developments taking place in Somalia in the aftermath of the collapse of central government that forced Ethiopia to intervene in Somalia. The conflicts involve international terrorists and other opposition elements to the incumbent Ethiopian government that have implications for Ethiopia and regional stability in many aspects (Hassan Yussuf Muhammed, 2014). This situation made it easier for these groups and other illicit traders to transfer light weapons across border for advancing their own interest. Al-Itihad, a popular internationalist Islamist groups in Somalia, declared war on Ethiopia and orchestrated attacks inside the Ethiopian territory.

Al-Itihad had military bases in Gedo region of southern Somalia, but had popularity and supporters throughout Somalia. The group had the political motive to establish an Islamic state in Somalia, and strived to spread Islamic radicalism in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, the conflict in Somalia created a platform for Ethiopian rebel groups that have created instability in Ethiopia. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), rebel group that fights with Ethiopia in the Ogaden region has got sympathizers and hiding places in Somalia to wage wars against Ethiopia. This kind of cooperations between different groups of interests in the region provide safe haven for transitional groups that might have the same agenda as the local ones in the conflict or exploit the conflict context to achieve their motives. This scenario in the Somali conflict created a serious security concern for Ethiopia.

Especially, the development in Somalia became a serious security concern to Ethiopia when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) captured territories close to the Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) bases in Baidoa and threatened its existence. The Islamists, whose motive is to impose strict Sharia rule in Somalia, have also repeatedly threatened Ethiopia and vowed to extend their rule to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital city. This provocation and claim of Ethiopian territory forced Ethiopia to intervene in Somalia militarily started in 2006. As a result, the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) invaded Somalia and ousted the ICU in South Central Somalia. The Ethiopian government explained its military action as a result of the threats posed against it.

The ENDF successfully dislodged the Islamists and helped the TFG to embark on its rule in larger territories in the South Central Somalia, including the capital city, Mogadishu. But as the case might be, in many conflicts where external forces intervene in internal conflict, the Islamists started an insurgency fighting against Ethiopia and the TFG. They started to regroup their forces in the far southern regions of Jubaland where they created training and recruiting camps for their fighters. While doing so, they also gained strong support within the local populations who perceived Ethiopian forces as invaders. This created a new dimension in the conflict. Many other groups, including jihadists from other parts of the world and other Ethiopian rebel groups joined the insurgency against Ethiopian forces in Somalia.

This increased threats that involved various variants of terrorist groups that posed serious security concern for the neighboring states, the wider region and beyond. Consequently, the United States of America (USA) government which considers itself as hegemony has started to assist and collaborate with Ethiopia and the TFG in order to prevent the potential insecurity “spill over” against its interest and the region. Several other friendly states and organizations also provided help to Ethiopia in the fighting against the Islamists. Since 2010, Ethiopia has more been engaged in the peace process in Somalia. Currently, the country has deepened its efforts to stabilize the neighboring state. Along with these negotiating different warring parties, Ethiopia has been helping the state of Somalia in its long struggle against terrorist activity. Following the current development in Somali peace, the current political dispensation in Somalia makes it difficult for terrorists to operate as freely as they used to. Most recently, the Ethiopian Prime Minister said “Ethiopia pledges to continue and intensify its support to bring sustainable peace and stability in Somalia. Ethiopia will continue its support as long as it is necessary and there is a need for it from the Somalis themselves” at Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa, held in Bahir Dar resort town of Ethiopia. Ethiopia has been working with the IGAD and AU for the regional peace and stability in harmony with stabilizing Somalia. It has been playing a vital role in facilitating dialogue and providing support to enable the administration of the Federal Government of Somalia to work jointly in building the Federal State of Somalia (The Ethiopian Herald, 2016).

The coming of USA to the Horn for the second time changed the power configuration in the region dividing countries and groups as pro and against. Many political analysts and academicians wrote about insignificance of geopolitics with the end of Cold War; however, the emergence of terrorist groups in the Middle East and their targeting of USA interest in the Horn forced US to join and lead the fight against these groups. The first initiative of USA was under the humanitarian motive, couched in terms of a 'new world order', and then after 9/11 by that of counter-terrorism.

The post-Cold War arrival of USA to the Horn and forging of allies polarized the region. Eritrea is among the anti-USA collation that bent on challenging the status qua. Especially, Eritrea was unhappy with Ethio-USA alignment as it has given Ethiopia upper hand in the issues of Horn of Africa. Consequently, Eritrea has started to work with those opposing camp against US allied powers. Thus, the Eritrea's foreign policy objective was tailored to deliberately surround and undermine the security of Ethiopia and create political and strategic discomfort so as to balance power configuration in the Horn of Africa (Berouk Mesfin, 2012). Anything that Ethiopia supports, Eritrea goes determinedly against it, a case in point being Ethiopia's support to Somalia's Transitional Federal Government and Eritrea's support to the Union of Islamic Courts and then Al Shabab Al Mujahedeen. Eritrea backs these anti-Ethiopian armed groups in Somalia as proxies for its long-standing conflict with Ethiopia, with the express objective of making Somalia a second front. It may seem ironic that Eritrea is supporting Somalia's Islamist groups for Eritrea, where Muslims and Christians are about equal in number.

Al-Qaeda provided support to the internal groups, mainly, the Islamists who fought against Ethiopia (Ibid). After a while, Ethiopia undertook military invention from 2006 to 2009 and the war between ENDF and insurgent groups created mass civilian displacement and humanitarian crises.

Though not official, some Arab states, Islamic Nations and their citizens sympathize and support the Islamists and other forces in Somalia. These hostile states have harbored and supported these opposition forces— both Islamist and non-Islamist groups – to operate freely in their countries for residency and fund-raising. Especially, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar are exploiting the

internal factors and dynamics in Somalia and accordingly pursue their own interests. In addition, according to numerous sources, the opposition and terrorist groups have been receiving aids from Iran, Turkey, Djibouti, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Sudan, Gaddafi's Libya, Yemen, Lebanon and Syria.

Djibouti has provided uniforms and medicines; Egypt has provided training within Somalia; and Iran has provided arms and ammunition. In 2006 for instance, the Somali government accused Iran for attempting to supply the Somali insurgents, mainly the UIC militia, with weapons; including machine guns, surface-to-air missiles, rocket launchers, and land mines, in exchange for the right to utilize Somalian uranium deposits (The Daily Telegraph, 2006); Lebanon's Hezbollah has provided military training and arms, and UIC fighters fought Israeli soldiers alongside Hezbollah in July 2006; Libya provided training, funds and arms; Eritrea provided arms, ammunition and military equipment; Saudi Arabia has imposed its dark ideology of Wuhabism and has provided financial- logistical support and ammunition; Yemen has played as the main source of small arms for Somali militants; Turkey's controversial presence in the very inner situation of Somalia has become eminent at increasing pace more than any counterpart Muslim countries and it has established its military bases in Somalia; and since the most recently, Qatar has been playing a significant role in Somalia with its petro dollar power.

As the wisdom of realism dictates, all external actors have been involving in Somalian conflict to advance their respective countries political, security and economic interests at the expense of the people of Somalia.

What is more, the conflict in Somalia sometimes takes the form of proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The issue of cultural affinity and history has played important role in the confrontation made between USA led coalition and anti-USA forces. Arab countries share a culture and religious ties with the Somali people; but Ethiopia and US, on the other hand not. Arabs and almost all Muslim countries consider Ethiopia as a traditional-historic enemy. Arabs have a similar tendency towards Eritrea; however quite opposite to Ethiopia (Wikipedia article, 2006).

Despite the mutual fear, suspicion and stereotype that exist between the two countries for generations, Ethiopia involved in Somalia as Ethiopia has large Somali population, share long borders with Somalia, and these usually make Ethiopia suffer from developments taking place in Somalia. Therefore, to permanently overcome these problems, Ethiopia opted for the establishment of central government in Somalia as a strategy.

To materialize its objective of establishing central government, Ethiopia initiated many peace processes.

The next chapter focuses on the peace process initiated by Ethiopia and the challenges faced will be discussed.

# **CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF ETHIOPIA IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION OF SOMALIA**

## **4.1 Peace initiatives in Somalia since 1991**

As an African state and the immediate neighbor that has stake in Somalia, Ethiopia has been supporting Somalia since the civil war broke out in 1990s.

The involvement of Ethiopia in the Somalia civil war basically emanates from its foreign relation and security strategy. Unlike the other external actors, Ethiopia has distinctive attributes with Somalia: longest border share and common peoples. These common features are considered both as an asset and liability. The absences of central government that use to effectively lead Somalia have implications for Ethiopia. To avoid such spillover effects, Ethiopia primarily set agenda for the stabilization of Somalia by facilitating dialogue among the Somali fighting factions so as to establish central government in Somalia.

As Hassan notes, Ethiopia played a key role in hosting a number of Somali Peace Conferences since the UN led reconciliation efforts in early 1990s. Ethiopia has been supporting in the resolution process of Somali crises since early 1990s (Hassan Abdi Aden, 2010). The first peace conference was held in Ethiopia-Addis Ababa in 1992. Afterwards, the March 1993 Conference on National Reconciliation held at Addis Ababa-Ethiopia, the Arta conference of Djibouti held in 2000, April-May; the National Salvation Council of Sodere, held in Ethiopia from November 1996 to January 1997; the 2000 March Conference held in Ethiopia, Awassa; the October 2002 and 2003 conferences on Somali National Reconciliation held in Djibouti held-Eldoret, and the March 1994 and the January 2004 Nairobi Conferences held in Kenya; the July-August 2007 National Reconciliation Conference held in Mogadishu of Somalia; and many others unlisted are the peace process initiatives assisted and facilitated by Ethiopia during the last two decades. For such peace conferences, Ethiopia has organized an International Committee, and Ethiopia has allocated lots of its financial resources. Ethiopia tried many times, by taking responsibly to deal with different warlords.

In line with the mandates of AU and IGAD given to her, Ethiopia had tried to bring together 26 Somali clan and political leaders at the resort town of Sodere during the last quarter of 1996. Following the Sodere deliberations, the 26 Somali leaders were able to establish the National Salvation Council (NSC) of Somalia in Addis Ababa in January 1997. As a consequence of the above, the NSC was able to operate from the same headquarters in Addis Ababa for more than a year. Besides, although the Sodere peace was adversely affected by a parallel peace initiative taken by Egypt in Cairo at the end of 1997 (Abebe Aynete, 2016). Prior, Egypt was also accused of advising key warlords including South Mogadishu strongman, General Hussein Mohammed Aidid, not to attend the talks in the Djibouti peace initiative of June-July 1991. Obviously, there was a power competition between the two warlords, Aidid [Head of the Somali National Alliance] and Ali Mahdi Muhammed [leader of the USC, the then President of Somalia: 1991-1997] in Mogadishu.

As part of its strategy, Ethiopia had worked hard to establish the central government in Somalia. Ethiopia in 2006 and in 2007 brought the Federal Government to Mogadishu with its intervention and so on. Ethiopia came up with idea to create different regional entities within Somalia and then to negotiate the Federal Government. Ethiopia adopted the ‘4+ strategy’ in Somalia for the start of this federal pact. The ‘four plus formula’, simply, refers to those four dominant clans; the Hawiye, the Darod, the Dir and the Isaaq. Accordingly, Ethiopia has been advising international community to support the establishment of a Federal Government in Somalia, what Ethiopia calls the ‘bottom-up approach’.

In this regard, there are critics arguing that Ethiopia is exporting its regional-ethnic federal model to Somalia. Moreover, Ethiopia has assisted Somalia in organizing the police and security forces. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces and the IGAD countries had begun to actively participate in the peace building process in Somalia. Ethiopia has fully integrated into the AMISOM and its military role has become visible particularly in hunting and fighting against fundamental Islamists, especially after 2011. From the very beginning, Ethiopia was actively getting involved in how AMISOM is structured and so on. The Federal Government would not be able to claim all those territories which are under AMISOM [Burundians, Kenyans,

Ugandans, Djiboutian and Ethiopians most are contributing members]. Militarily, it is Ethiopia however still covering more than 60 percent to the AMISOM (Dawit Yohannes, 2016).

Hence, Ethiopia tried to manage the conflict of Somalia, mainly since the 1996 of Soderre Conference; in terms of creating awareness of the international community, and in terms of bringing in the different groups and peoples in Ethiopia.

Realistically speaking, the Ethiopia's role is basically one of facilitating, organizing conferences and clarifying to the international community and capacitating the legitimate government in Somalia.

In comparison with her neighbors, Ethiopia is giant due to her population, military, geography size, alliance with USA, shares borders with almost all Horn states. These elements undoubtedly make Ethiopia as regional Power that helped her to play significant role in the Region, including the civil war in Somalia. However, as the reality on the ground dictates, Ethiopia cannot resolve the conflict of Somalia alone. The war needs billions of Dollar and other related materials and moral support from friends and allies. In this regard, Ethiopia has limited financial and other required resources. Therefore, to attain its objective with the existing meager resources, Ethiopia came up with the strategy of containing the crises in Somalia. In fact, Ethiopia in this regard is able to contain the crisis with tact; much better than other neighboring countries (Asnake Kefale, 2016).

Ethiopia has less than 5, 000 troops within Somalia and has created a buffer zone. It is designed to make sure that Al-Shabab does not undertake attacks within its territory. In fact, Ethiopia is on fighting and weakening Al-Shabab; monitoring, studying vulnerabilities and strength of the group; and sometimes negotiating with the group. In general, Ethiopia is able to contain Al-Shaba, but cannot defeat them. Though Al-Shaba get weakened, Al-Shabab will present with a certain section of population; they will present the Islamist ideological stands; and therefore Ethiopia cannot defeat them. They have mixed with the society, they have sympathizers and networks. It is a Social Movement. Thus, it is impossible to resolve the crises in Somalia until it involves wider Somalia solutions that would be conducted on amicable basis.

## **4.2 Perceptions of various parties over Ethiopia's actions in Somalia**

Perception lies positive or negative. There is a considerable range of perception among the world community on the Ethiopia's role in Somalia, expressed in different and contentious ways.

To begin with, the incumbent Ethiopian government legitimizes its actions in Somalia stating that there are eminent and extensional threats to its security posed by terrorist groups that amassed along the border due to the absence of central government in Somalia. Moreover, at times Ethiopia claims that she is invited by the Somalian Transitional Government to save the Somali people from terrorist groups.

As to some pro-Ethiopia intervention groups and sympathizers, the national security concerns of Ethiopia motivated it not to wait until the instability in Somalia comes to it. Ethiopia does not wait terrorists to come and attack it; she enters into Somalia and finds them before they develop a capacity to attack her and make them weaker so that they will never have time to develop the capacity to pose a threat to her in the future. This is an investment Ethiopia has been making to its long term National Security Objectives (Temesgen Aregay, 2016). Ethiopia needs a stable Somalia, due to the fact that the security of Somalia and Ethiopia is interdependent. To do so, since 1991, Ethiopia takes different levels of measures by different steps: in regional forums, in the AU level, and even at the stage of the international community. It has facilitated peace initiatives by creating alliance and good relationships with such various bilateral and multilateral bodies.

From the side of Somalia, the Federal Government of Somalia appreciates Ethiopia's proactive measures it takes, for the effectiveness of the Ethiopian Military. However, the Somalia government criticizes Ethiopia's dealing with the clan leaders and lack of responsibility, when it comes to inquiries [the inquiry on ENDF, for the death of Somali civilians].

Criticism against Ethiopian intervention in Somalia comes from within. There are Ethiopians who negatively characterize the role of Ethiopia's government in Somalia; these are mainly the

opposition groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the ONLF, Diasporas, the Islamic Front for Liberation of Oromia, the Patriotic *Ginbot 7* (or the Movement for Unity and Democracy) and other others.

In addition, various sections of Somalia community have different perceptions about the role of Ethiopia in Somalia. The old and young generations of Somalia towards Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia varies. There are some extreme groups and individuals who perceive Ethiopia as invader and traditional enemy to Somalis. For instance, the Ethiopian military intervention of 2006 in Somalia was articulated by these peoples as invasion. They see Ethiopia as interfering force in the Somalia's internal affairs. They perceive Ethiopia's efforts in Somalia as very bad, complaining that Ethiopia is destroying Somalia, killing many Somali civilians and many rebel members (Isleman Ali and Fartun Mehamed, 2016).

Fundamental Jihadists and other armed rebel groups of Somalia also believe in that Ethiopia is their real enemy. These primarily include Al-Shabab, al-Ithaad al-Islamiya, Ahlu Sunna WalJama'a, Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia, Hizbul Islam, Jabhatul Islamiya/Islamic Courts Union, Mu'askar Anole, Ras Kamboni Brigades, and Somali National Front (Adamu, 2016). These groups are not totally happy with the Ethiopia's overall involvement in that country, Somalia. Because, they believe that Ethiopia is in Somalia just to support a particular group and that particular group may not be popular throughout that Country. For that reason, there are various attempts by Somali Islamists to attack the AU headquarter buildings; and other important buildings in Addis Ababa. So, Somali terrorists always try to do that.

Overall, Ethiopia's interference in Somalia's internal affairs since 1991 has been highly unpopular with many Somalis, who view Somaliland and Puntland as Ethiopian creations intended to divide Somalia. Ethiopia's provision of assistance to militias in order to fight Al-Shabaab forces and its occasional military incursions have strengthened this image (Mikael Eriksson, 2013:114). Whatever Ethiopia does in Somalia, the bulk of Somalis will simply interpret it as an attempt to divide and weaken the country. The predominant impression in

Ethiopian decision-making circles is that most Somalis will always be suspicious of any action taken by Ethiopia even when the latter is acting in good faith.

As well, the views of international community about Ethiopia's role in Somalia differ, some support others oppose it.

Some countries and groups legitimized Ethiopia's actions in Somalia. They sympathize and view Ethiopia as a strong country that is fighting and contained the international terrorist groups. The proponents of this perspective urged that international community to support Ethiopia in all aspects. These include international regimes such as IGAD countries, AU and UN.

Those who reject Ethiopian role in Somalia viewed the action of Ethiopia as illegitimate that was driven by her own interest that could in the long run exacerbate inter-Somalian war and open Avenue for ramifications of the terrorist groups.

Some UN member states used UN forum to criticize Ethiopia's action in Somalia (Simon Bedza, 2016). For instance, the League of Arab States like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, particularly the Gulf States like Qatar, United Arab Emirates and several Muslim nations and the neighboring Eritrea too are criticizing Ethiopia. They have the objective of undermining the leverage Ethiopia has in Somalia. However, there are countries that really appreciate Ethiopia like the US obviously. And, we would see that some European countries are quite suspicious of the Ethiopia's motives in Somalia, especially Italy which is the former colonial power of Somalia. There is at times also disagreement with Kenya and with Uganda on the Ethiopia's activities in Somalia. Furthermore, the Federal orientation of recent Somali administrations is seen as an Ethiopian strategy to weaken the Somali state. These perceptions were further exacerbated by the undermining role played by states of Arab countries, Islamic nations and Eritrea, which have continually acted as spoilers in Ethiopia's constructive attempts to bring peace and stability to Somalia.

## **Optimistic tendencies**

The overall perceptions of Somali people towards Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia are not positive. The reasons for the prevalence of these perceptions are both domestic and external.

However, these perceptions are gradually started to change as the intervention help them get rid of the painful experiences that the Somali people have experienced under the state of nature where there is no law and order, where there is no infrastructure such as schools, health centers, etc.

Despite its negative rating that was reinforced by history, Ethiopian intervention attempted to bridge these gaps forcing many skeptical minded individuals and groups to change their attitude towards Ethiopia.

To mention some, Ethiopia has been playing important role in political and security spheres, created enabling atmosphere in transport, energy, electricity, trade and investment networks. In addition, for generating and strengthening of public to public link, Ethiopia has annually been giving free scholarships to the Somalis. Ethiopia offers for about more than 200 Somali students at its universities annually. Ethiopia is also accepting and assisting many Somali refugees; and the large Somali Diaspora is living in Ethiopia.

According to the Ethiopian government officials, Ethiopia has sacrificed many things: human lives, economy, time, and committed human resource to the Somalis that is why Ethiopia became successful in winning the hearts and minds of the majority of Somalis who start to perceive Ethiopia as the genuine partner (Gebre-sellssie Gebre-egzabher, 2016). As to Gebre-sellssie, the relative peace and stability in Somalia, and some government structures in the regions and the Federal state were laid and capacitated predominantly by the effort of Ethiopia. Ethiopia is preoccupied with creating the favorable conditions for the Somalis.

As to Somaliland diplomat, Ethiopia is presenting itself as a genuine partner and neutral actor in its role of managing the conflict of Somalia. As to this diplomat, Ethiopia is helping the government of Somalia as well as the Society. As the result, the people of Somalia have changed their perceptions toward Ethiopia and view Ethiopia as a partner in the areas of peace, capacity building and in areas of trade (Ladna Hassan, 2016).

# **CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUDING REMARKS**

## **5.1 Conclusions**

This study has analyzed the role of Ethiopia in Somalia by focusing on her efforts in the processes of conflict resolution since the downfall of Siyad Barre regime in early 1990s.

Ethiopia's role in Somalia has many dimensions: On one hand, fighting international terrorist groups and other hostile groups, and on the other hand initiating peace process that leads to the establishment of central government.

In her efforts of attaining the above mentioned goal, Ethiopia has got the support of allies like US, EU, AU and IGAD. Ethiopia effectively utilized international regime to legitimize her actions and thereby weaken and corner terrorist and hostile groups that would endanger Ethiopian peace and security. However, she failed to materialize the goal of establishing central government that was intended to effectively administer and run the entire state.

So far, the internationally recognized national government that was established through the facilitation and influence of Ethiopia lacks internal legitimacy that makes it unable to go out of the capital, Mogadishu. The central government that was presumed to effectively administer the country failed to protect itself, and so far protected by AMSOM.

The reasons for this failure are many. Among others, the peace process itself was mainly driven by competing interest of external actors that sidelined the Somalia people. As it was mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, when Ethiopia sponsored Somalia peace process, Egypt used to hijack it for its own end result, which created confusion and frustration in the peace process. This was coupled with the involvement of other countries like Eritrea and some Arab countries and Islamic nations that directly or indirectly engaged in sabotaging the peace process.

The intervention of Ethiopia in Somalian affairs enabled some sections of Somalia to benefit from the relative peace, infrastructure development and other related benefits individually and collectively. However, as the information gathered from various sources indicate that many

Somali groups have not seen Ethiopia as a neutral arbiter, rather as an occupying force that manipulate the people for her own national interest. Many see the outcome of the peace process (the establishment of central government) as zero-sum game where few handpicked elites are benefiting at the expense of the majority. This position and stance of the elite group mainly has contributed for lack of legitimacy on the part of the national government, opening door for absence of law and order creating conducive environment for terrorist group to flourish.

In sum, though Ethiopia's role in Somalia appears to be idealistic; in reality, it has been dominated by realism that is bent on advancing Ethiopian national interest.

## **5.2 Recommendations**

To bring about a lasting peace in Somalia,

1. The peace initiative must come from within, not from the outside. It is through empowering the internal Somalian forces that sustainable solution can emerge;
2. The conflict of Somalia cannot be solved by military means alone, but through constructive and an inclusive negotiations;
3. Ethiopia and other secondary actors should pursue their assistance inclusively to all Somalis on the basis of facilitation mode;
4. The great powers of this world notably the US, Russia, and China; and the UN and the EU have to provide their genuine supports in maintaining the conflict of Somalia as they have done in the Middle East, Afghanistan and elsewhere; and
5. IGAD member states must follow similar approach that empowers the Somali people to openly talk and amicably solve their problem by themselves.

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
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# ANNEXES

## Annex I: Maps and Graphs



Picture 1: Map of United Somalia (1960 - 1991)





Picture 2: Map of Divided Somalia (Since 1991)




Picture 3: Self-Declared Republic of Somaliland (Source: the Republic of Somaliland's Permanent Diplomatic Mission to Ethiopia, Addis Ababa)

# Ethnic Groups



Picture 4: Clans distribution of Somalia (Source: [www.google.com.et/clan-distribution-of-Somalia](http://www.google.com.et/clan-distribution-of-Somalia))



Picture 5: Major Clans and Sub-Clans in Somalia

## **Annex II: List of Interview Questions**

**Dear Sir, Madam,**

Thank you for taking the time to answer this questionnaire. It may take between 25 to 35 minutes of your time. You are very welcome to expand in any of the questions and to raise additional issues related to the role of Ethiopia in the resolution of Somali conflict. This questionnaire is fully confidential and also not individual names will ever appear in the research paper unless specifically requested.

Thank you,

Abebaw Asnake Aychew

Indira Gandhi National Open University School of Social Science

Your Organization: \_\_\_\_\_

Your name: (Optional) \_\_\_\_\_

Your Functional Title/Area of Work: (Optional) \_\_\_\_\_

- 1. What are the underlying causes for the conflicts in Somalia?**
- 2. Who are the primary and secondary actors in the Somalia Conflict?**
- 3. Does Ethiopia have the capacity to deal with the complex and endless civil war in Somalia?**
- 4. Has Ethiopia perceived by conflicting parties as neutral actor?**

### Annex III: List of Informants

<b>No</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Date of Interview</b>
1	Mr Abebe Aynete	Senior researcher; Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development	08 December 2015
2	Mr Dawit Yohannes	PhD candidate and Staff member in the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, AAU	04 February 2016
3	Mr. Simon Bedza	Political Officer, Peace and Security Council Secretariat, African Union Commission	06 March 2016
4	Mr. Hassen Abdi Ali	Diplomat, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Somalia to Ethiopia	07 February 2016
5	Mr. Gebre-sellssie Gebre-egzabher	Director General, Nile Basin States Affairs; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	08 February 2016
6	Mrs. Ladna Hassan Rabi	Public Relations and Communication Officer, Republic of Somaliland's Permanent Diplomatic Mission to Ethiopia	10 February 2016
7	Dr. Asnake Kefale	Lecturer and Political Scientist, Department of Political Science and International Relations, AAU	14 February 2016
8	Mr. Berouk Mesfin	Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis, Institute for Security Studies of Africa	16 February 2016
9	Lieutenant Colonel Temesgen Aregay	Director, Plan and Transformation Directorate, Ministry of Defense of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	17 February 016
10	Mr. Adamu Agid	High ranking politician of the former Ethiopian Regime (Mengistu Haile-mariam's Dergue)	18 February 2016
11	Patriot Ejigu Birresaw	Senior Military Officer of the former Ethiopian Regime (Haile-sellassie-I's Regime)	18 February 2016
12	Mr. Isleman Ali	Member of Somali Community in Ethiopia	19 March 2016
13	Mis. Fartun Mehamed	Member of Somali Community in Ethiopia	19 March 2016
14	Dr. Fantahun Ayele	Lecturer, Historian and Case team leader for Journal publications; College of Social Sciences, Bahir Dar University	20 April 2016