DC Field | Value | Language |
dc.contributor.author | Nalbandian, Elise G. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-12T11:55:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-01-12T11:55:14Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009-09 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2765 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Ronald Dworkin has based his theory of law on his on-going critique of
positivist theories of law, especially the theory developed by Hart in “The
Concept of Law”, as Dworkin believed that Hart’s theory was the “ruling
theory of law”.1 Over the years, however, Dworkin's theory has evolved in
the course of his response to critiques of his work or alternatively due to the
fact that positivists in response to his criticisms, adapted the theory of
positivism. From the 1960's onwards, this evolution of the anti-positivist
theory can arguably be said to have occurred in three phases. Although it is
possible to look at Dworkin’s theory in various ways, this particular note will
take the approach of understanding how these three phases of development in
his theory evolved and changed while enriching his interpretive theory all the
time focusing on his developing critiques on Hart’s work. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | St. Mary's University | en_US |
dc.subject | RONALD DWORKIN’S THEORY, LAW | en_US |
dc.title | Vol. 3 No.2: NOTES ON RONALD DWORKIN’S THEORY OF LAW | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Mizan Law Review
|